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The framers of the United States Constitution protected
copyrights by including a provision that grants Congress the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries . . . ."1 Today, the scope of federal
copyright protection is determined by the Copyright Act of 1976 and,
to some extent, by case precedent. A copyright holder has exclusive
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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rights2 and when those rights are infringed upon, the copyright holder
may bring a copyright infringement action against the infringer.
3
If a copyright holder is successful in such an action, she is
entitled to statutorily-provided remedies, which may include
temporary and permanent injunctions 4 and the impounding or
destruction of infringing copies. 5 Additionally, the copyright holder
may elect to receive either statutory or actual damages. 6 Actual
damages are determined by subtracting deductible expenses from the
infringer's gross infringing revenue. 7 However, "[n]either the Act nor
the Committee Reports specify which expenses will be regarded as
deductible costs" and therefore, one must turn to case law for the
answer.8
Although the Supreme Court has ruled that the federal income
tax paid by a willful trademark infringer on gross infringing revenue
is not a proper deductible expense when calculating actual damages, 9
the circuits are split on the issue of tax deductibility for non-willful
infringers. The Second and Ninth Circuits have held that tax10 is a
proper deductible expense where copyright infringement is non-
willful.' 1 Although there is no opposing copyright case law, the Sixth
Circuit stated in a design patent infringement case that tax was not a
proper deductible expense in any infringement scenario.12
There are four possible solutions to the issue of whether tax is
a proper deductible expense in cases of non-willful copyright
infringement. The first view is that set forth by the Second and Ninth
2. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
3. Id. § 501.
4. Id. § 502(a).
5. Id. § 503(a)-(b).
6. Id. § 504.
7. See id. § 504(b). For purposes of this note, the phrase "gross infringing revenue"
will refer to the portion of an infringer's gross revenue that is attributable to their
infringement.
8. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.03[C]
(2005).
9. L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. WM. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U.S. 97, 100 (1928).
10. For purposes of this note, the term "tax" will refer to the federal income tax that
an infringer has paid on his or her gross infringing revenue.
10. The term "deductible expense" is used only in the context of calculating actual
damages. For example, if gross infringing revenue was $100,000 and the infringer paid
$35,000 in taxes on that revenue, a court that allowed tax as a deductible expense would
conclude that the actual damages owed to the holder of the intellectual property were
$65,000 (assuming the infringer had no other deductible expenses). The term "deduction" is
used primarily in the context of filing an individual or corporate tax return.
11. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 488 (9th Cir. 2000); In Design
v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1994).
12. See Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1171 (6th Cir. 1980).
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Circuits-namely that tax is a proper deductible expense for non-
willful copyright infringers. 13 The second view, extrapolated from the
Sixth Circuit's design patent infringement case, is that tax is not a
proper deductible expense in any copyright infringement scenario.
14
The third view, derived from a patent infringement case decided in the
Third Circuit, is that tax is a proper deductible expense in cases of
non-willful copyright infringement but the infringer remains liable for
any tax benefit that they later receive as a result of including the
damage award as a tax deduction on a subsequent tax return.1 5 The
final view, taken from a patent infringement case decided in the
Seventh Circuit, is that tax is a proper deductible expense in cases of
non-willful copyright infringement but the amount of the deduction is
the amount the copyright holder would have paid had he or she
received the infringing revenue in the first instance. 16
Case law is sparse on the issue of tax deductibility for non-
willful infringers and, as such, cases representing copyright, patent,
and trademark infringement have been used interchangeably in an
attempt to develop a rule. It is necessary to point out, however, that
there are different standards for obtaining and protecting these three
different types of intellectual property. As such, this Note will first
analyze the remedies available for copyrights, patents, and
trademarks to determine whether different standards should apply
regarding the deductibility of taxes from gross infringing revenue
when determining actual damage awards. Next, this Note analyzes
arguments that have been presented in favor of each of the possible
solutions to the issue of tax deductibility. Finally, this Note advocates
the adoption of the Second and Ninth Circuits' view that tax is a
proper deductible expense for non-willful copyright infringers.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Tax and its Role in Legal Actions
It is no secret that the determination of tax liability is an
intricate process. The tax rate applicable to individuals varies greatly,
depending on variables such as gross income, tax status (such as
13. Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 488; In Design, 13 F.3d at 567.
14. See Schnadig, 620 F.2d at 1171.
15. See Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. L.E. Smith Glass Co., 23 F.2d 459, 463-64 (3d
Cir. 1927)
16. See L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. WM. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 20 F.2d 830, 834 (7th Cir.
1927), rev'd, 277 U.S. 97, 100 (1928).
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married or unmarried), and allowable deductions. 17 Moreover, an
entirely separate set of rules applies to corporations.18
One commonality between individual and corporate tax law is
that "gross income means all income from whatever source derived,"'19
which includes damage payments received by a patent holder as a
result of a victory in an infringement lawsuit.20 In United States v.
Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., the Supreme Court held that
profits owed to a patent holder from a patent infringer are income
within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code. 21  Because
"copyrights are so closely analogous to patents a the principals
gleaned from cases dealing with the tax treatment of patent litigation
recoveries are applicable and can be relied on for the tax treatment of
copyright litigation recoveries. '22 Therefore, when a copyright holder
receives a damage award from a copyright infringer, the award is
taxable income for the copyright holder. Furthermore, the copyright
infringer may include the paid damage award as a tax deduction on a
subsequent tax return.23
B. A Rule of Non-Deductibility Applies to Willful Copyright Infringers
The Supreme Court has held that in cases of willful trademark
infringement, tax is not a proper deductible expense when calculating
actual damages suffered by the trademark holder. 24 In Larson,
William Wrigley, Jr., Company ("Wrigley") brought a trademark
infringement suit against L.P. Larson, Jr., Company ("Larson")
alleging that Larson had marketed its "Peptomint" gum in packaging
that was a "flagrant and fraudulent imitation" of Wrigley's
"Spearmint" gum packaging.25 Wrigley obtained a temporary
injunction against Larson, which remained in force until the case was
dismissed.26
17. See MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 2:1 (2005).
18. See id. § 2:48.
19. I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 2005).
20. United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 93 (1936); see
also Mathey v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 177 F.2d 259, 260-61 (1st Cir. 1949).
21. 297 U.S. at 93.
22. MARVIN PETRY, TAXATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 8.09 (2005).
23. See I.R.C. § 162; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(c), examples (1), (3); see generally
Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1169 (1980).
24. L.P. Larson, Jr., Co., v. WM. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U.S. 97, 100 (1928).




While the injunction was in force, Wrigley brought another
trademark infringement suit against Larson.27 In this second suit,
Wrigley claimed that Larson's "Wintermint" packaging infringed on
Wrigley's "Doublemint" packaging. 28 In a twist of fate, the Seventh
Circuit determined that Larson's Wintermint packaging had come
onto the market first.29 As a result, the court granted Larson a
perpetual and universal injunction, 30 and awarded Larson nearly $1.4
million in damages.31 In determining the amount of the damage
award, the court allowed Wrigley to deduct the amount of tax that
Larson would have paid had Larson received the infringing revenue in
the first instance.
32
On the issue of tax deductibility, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed the Seventh Circuit. The Court explained that
the determination as to whether tax was a proper deductible expense
turned in part on the facts of the particular case, which included "the
knowledge and the conduct of the party charged."33 Couching its
argument by stating that there were undoubtedly "cases in which such
a deduction would be proper,"3 4 the Court held:
It would be unjust to charge an infringer with the gross amount of his sales
without allowing him for the materials and labor that were necessary to produce
the things sold, but it does not follow that he should be allowed what he paid for
the chance to do what he knew that he had no right to do .... Even if the only
relief that the Wrigley Company can get is a deduction from gross income when the
amount of its liability is finally determined, the Larson Company will have to pay a
tax on the Wrigley profits when it receives them, and in a case of what has been
found to have been one of conscious and deliberate wrongdoing, we think it just
that the further deduction should not be allowed.
3 5
C. The Circuit Split
Currently, there is an inter-circuit split on the issue of tax
deductibility in intellectual property infringement cases. Four circuits,
the Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth, have held that tax is a proper
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 734.
30. In re L.P. Larson, Jr., Co., 275 F. 535, 538 (7th Cir. 1921).
31. L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. WM. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 20 F.2d 830, 831 (7th Cir. 1927)
rev'd, 277 U.S. 97, 100 (1928).
32. Id. at 834.
33. L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. WM. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U.S. 97, 100 (1928).
34. Id. at 99.
35. Id. at 100.
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deductible expense for non-willful infringers. 36 The Sixth Circuit,
however, has held that tax is not a proper deductible expense in any
infringement scenario.
37
In Stromberg Motor Devices Co. v. Zenith Carburetor Co., the
plaintiff held valid patents on four carburetors for internal-combustion
engines. 38 The court found that the defendant infringed on all four
patents. 39 In a connected case, the Seventh Circuit held that the
infringement was non-willful and therefore, that the defendant was
entitled to "deduct from profits the amount of its federal taxes during
the infringing period ... 40
The court's decision to allow the deduction rested primarily on
the limiting language in Larson.41 The court noted:
[W]e infer from the [Larson] opinion that the denial [of a tax deduction] was
predicated largely, if not entirely, upon the conclusion that the accounting party
was doing "what he knew that he had no right to do." The court said: "No doubt
there are cases in which such a deduction would be proper. * * * Circumstances
will affect the conclusion, including in them the knowledge and the conduct of the
party charged." If from this language it may be concluded that where the
accounting party had been acting in good faith, and with his infringement there
was no admixture of deliberation or willfulness, "such a deduction would be
proper." If not in such a case, we fail to comprehend the significance of what was
so said [in Larson].
42
In Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., the plaintiff held a
valid patent for the manufacture of laminated glass. 43 After finding
that the defendants infringed upon the patent, the Third Circuit held
"that the defendants were innocent infringers" 44 and that, therefore,
tax was a proper deductible expense. 45 In coming to its conclusion, the
court relied on the limiting language in Larson as well as precedent
from the Second and Third Circuits. 46 The court stated: "We do not
36. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 488 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that tax is a proper deductible expense for non-willful copyright infringers); In Design v. K-
Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 562 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding same); Duplate Corp. v.
Triplex Safety Glass Co., 81 F.2d 352, 356 (3d Cir. 1935), modified by 298 U.S. 448 (1936)
(holding that tax is a proper deductible expense for non-willful patent infringers);
Stromberg Motor Devices Co. v. Detroit Trust Co., 44 F.2d 958, 965 (7th Cir. 1930) (holding
same). These opinions are analyzed above in the order in which they were decided.
37. Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1171 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding
that tax is not a proper deductible expense for any design patent infringer).
38. 254 F. 68, 69 (7th Cir. 1918).
39. Id.
40. Detroit Trust, 44 F.2d at 965.
41. Id.; see L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. WM. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U.S. 97, 100 (1928).
42. Detroit Trust, 44 F.2d at 965 (citing Larson, 277 U.S. at 99-100).
43. 81 F.2d 352, 353 (3d Cir. 1934), modified by 298 U.S. 448 (1936).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 356.
46. Id.
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think that [Larson] is determinative, for whereas the defendant in
that case was found guilty of a conscious and deliberate infringement,
the defendants in the instant case infringed in good faith."47 The court
also cited the Second Circuit's opinion in Stromberg Motor Devices Co.
v. Zenith Detroit Corp.,48 and the Third Circuit's opinion in Macbeth-
Evans Glass Co. v. L.E. Smith Glass Co.,49 concluding that those cases
"have held that federal income taxes actually paid may be deducted as
a proper item of expense in a patent accounting."
50
In In Design v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., the plaintiff held a valid
copyright in a design and sold sweaters bearing the copyrighted
design.5 1 After the plaintiff stopped selling their sweaters, they
learned that the defendant was preparing to sell sweaters bearing the
same design and subsequently notified the defendant of the alleged
infringement. 52 After investigating the matter, the defendant
determined that their sweaters did not infringe on the plaintiffs
copyrighted design and as such, they went ahead and put their
product on the market. 53 The trial court determined that the
defendant's sweaters did in fact infringe on the plaintiffs copyright.
54
The trial court also held, however, that the defendant had justifiably
relied on carefully prepared legal advice regarding the alleged
infringement and was therefore, a non-willful copyright infringer.
55
Reversing the trial court's decision regarding the deductibility of tax,
the Second Circuit held that tax was a proper deductible expense.
56
As had the Third and Seventh Circuits before it, the Second
Circuit based its conclusion on case precedent. First, the court
acknowledged the holding in Larson, stating that "[iut is settled law
that the income tax paid on profits is not deductible where
infringement was conscious and deliberate."57 Next, the court
explained that the Supreme Court "carefully limited the breadth of its
47. Id.
48. 23 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1934).
49. 23 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1927)
50. Duplate, 81 F.2d at 356. The court did not enforce and therefore implicitly
overruled the Macbeth-Evans rule that when tax is a proper deductible expense, the
infringer remains liable to the patent holder for any tax benefit the infringer later receives
as a result of including the damage award as a deduction on a subsequent tax return. See
id.





56. Id. at 567.
57. Id. at 566.
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holding recognizing that there could be cases where the circumstances
of the infringer's conduct dictated that such a tax deduction would be
proper."58 The court then cited both Stromberg Motor Devices Co. v.
Detroit Trust Co.5 9 and Stromberg Motor Devices Co. v. Zenith-Detroit
Corp.60 for the proposition that tax was a proper deductible expense
for non-willful patent infringers, and thereby extended that rule to
cases of non-willful copyright infringement.6
1
Next, the court cited two copyright infringement cases where it
had held that tax was not a proper deductible expense for willful
copyright infringers. 62 In both cases, however, the court stated in dicta
that tax was a proper deductible expense in cases of non-willful
copyright infringement. 63
Closing up its precedent-based arguments, the Second Circuit
explained that the district court, in determining that an income tax
deduction was not proper, had improperly relied on Love v. Kwitny,
772 F.Supp. 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).64 Love was a copyright
infringement case in which the district court held that tax was not a
proper deductible expense in any case of copyright infringement. 65 The
Second Circuit affirmed the decision in Love without opinion, which
meant that the opinion was not binding precedent. 66 Whatever door
the court may have opened in affirming Love, it closed with its ruling
in In Design.
Finally, the court considered and rejected the reasoning
articulated in the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines
Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166 (6th Cir. 1980).67 First, the court opined: "We
think that when a claim is made for infringing profits, 'this means
profits actually made. A book profit of one dollar is not a profit
actually made when from the dollar the government takes twenty
cents as the price for the right to make any profit at all.' "68 Then the
58. Id.
59. 44 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1930).
60. 23 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1934).
61. Id.
62. In Design, 13 F.3d at 566-67 (citing Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,
191 F.2d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 1951); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 53
(2d Cir. 1939)).
63. See Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 106; Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 53.
64. In Design, 13 F.3d at 567.
65. 772 F. Supp. at 1371.
66. In Design, 13 F.3d at 567.
67. Id.; see Schnadig, 620 F.2d at 1171 (The Sixth Circuit held that there is no
statutory "distinction between willful and negligent infringers" with regard to the
deductibility of tax).
68. In Design, 13 F.3d at 567 (quoting Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. L.E. Smith
Glass Co., 23 F.2d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1927)).
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court criticized the Sixth Circuit's tax discussions, explaining that
"[h]ypothetical discussions of possible indirect tax ramifications do not
change this basic fact."69
Approximately six years after In Design was decided, the Ninth
Circuit confirmed the Second Circuit's holding in the context of
copyright infringement. 70 In Three Boys Music v. Bolton, the plaintiff
had a copyright in its song, "Love is a Wonderful Thing."71 The
defendant, Michael Bolton, was found to have non-willfully infringed
on the plaintiffs copyright.72 The court held that because the
defendant was a non-willful infringer, tax was a proper deductible
expense.
73
Before ruling, the court carefully considered its options. The
court explained that a rule allowing the deduction gives the infringer
a potential windfall because she pays a smaller damage award and
she may claim the damage award as a tax deduction on a subsequent
tax return. 74 On the other hand, the court explained, a rule
disallowing the deduction gives the copyright holder a potential
windfall because he receives a larger pre-tax award. 75 Without further
discussion, the court held that a rule allowing the deduction was
appropriate in cases of non-willful copyright infringement.
76
The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit to have decided a case
which could be interpreted as holding that tax is not a proper
deductible expense in any copyright infringement case.77 In Schnadig,
the plaintiff held a valid design patent on a three-piece Spanish motif
sectional sofa suite. 78 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
finding that the defendant infringed on the design patent.79 Although
the district court did not explicitly determine whether the
infringement was willful, the Sixth Circuit explained that the record
supported a finding that the defendant's copying "was intentional and
69. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 77-86.
70. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 487-88 (9th Cir. 2000).
71. Id. at 480.
72. See id. at 488.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 487.
75. Id. at 488.
76. Id.
77. Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1171 (6th Cir. 1980); see also
Love v. Kwitny, 772 F. Supp. 1367, 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (purporting to follow Schnadig in
holding that tax is not a proper deductible expense in any copyright infringement case).
78. Schnadig, 620 F.2d at 1167. The remedies available to design patent holders
are generally the same as those available to traditional patent holders. See 35 U.S.C. § 171
(2000).
79. Schnadig, 620 F.2d at 1167.
2006]
594 VANDERBILTJ. OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW [Vol. 8:3:585
'in willful disregard of plaintiffs rights.' "80 Nevertheless, the court
held that tax was not a proper deductible expense in any case of
design patent infringement, explicitly disregarding the issue of
willfulness.81
The court's holding rested primarily on the premise that
infringers who pay a damage award may include the award as a tax
deduction on a subsequent tax return.8 2 The court acknowledged that
an award of pre-tax profits may seem harsh because it requires an
infringer to pay more in damages than he or she gained were able to
gain from the infringement.8 3 However, the court reasoned, a pre-tax
award is not so harsh because the infringer may be reimbursed for
some or all of the taxes paid on the infringing revenue if he or she
were to include the award as a tax deduction on a subsequent tax
return.8 4 The court admitted that "the actual dollar impact of a
damage award on the taxes of either party will naturally depend on
the party's overall tax situation [because] . . . [t]ax rates will vary, and
offsetting losses could conceivably bar use of the deduction or negate
any tax effect of the award."8 5 Nonetheless, the court concluded that
because a taxpayer has several years in which to utilize a tax
deduction, "the vast majority of infringers should be able to utilize
it.,186
D. The Scholarly Debate Begins
In 1997, a law review article examined the reasoning employed
by the Second Circuit in In Design and by the Sixth Circuit in
Schnadig.8 7 The authors recommend that courts adopt a rule of non-
deductibility in all copyright infringement cases.88 In their article, the
authors praise the Sixth Circuit's analysis and posit that a rule of non-
deductibility8 9 in all copyright infringement scenarios has three
80. Id. at 1171.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1169.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1169-70.
86. Id. at 1170.
87. See Matthew McNicholas & John P. McNicholas, Non-Deductibility is a
Wonderful Thing: Federal Income Taxes Should Not Be Deductible When Calculating Net
Profits in a Copyright Infringement Suit, 5 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 71 (1997).
88. Id. at 72.
89. A rule of non-deductibility means that tax is not a proper deductible expense
while a rule of deductibility means that tax is a proper deductible expense.
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primary benefits.90 First, it prevents a copyright infringer from
yielding any economic gain.91 Second, it provides a copyright holder
with all of the profits attributable to the infringement.92 And, finally,
the infringer is potentially able to recover the tax paid on infringing
revenue on a subsequent tax return. 93 Even if the infringer is not able
to recover all taxes paid, the authors argue, the infringer is the proper
party to bear the loss.
94
Plausible arguments have been set forth on both sides of the
tax deductibility issue. While there is currently more precedential
support for a rule allowing deductibility in the case of non-willful
copyright infringement, a majority of circuits have yet to decide a case
involving this issue. Without guidance from either Congress or the
Supreme Court, the remaining circuit courts will be left to develop
their own solutions.
II. ANALYSIS
A. An Overview of Copyright Law and Copyright Infringement
Copyright protection is guaranteed by the United States
Constitution, which states that Congress has the power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries . . . ."95 To understand who "authors" are,
what "writings" means, and how much protection "authors" get for
their "writings," one must turn to the Copyright Act of 1976 and case
precedent.
The Supreme Court has defined an author as "he to whom
anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work
of science or literature."96 The idea that an author must create
something original to obtain copyright protection has carried over into




94. Id. at 87-88 ("Since the plaintiff has no control over an infringers' behavior, it is
unable to force the infringer to seek recourse to the appropriate deduction, and cannot
itself act to utilize the equitable result such a deduction creates. As a result, the infringer
is the only entity that can utilize the deduction and protect its financial position, and
should therefore bear any loss its inaction procures. This is certainly the fairest outcome,
placing the loss on the infringer as the party that can act with the least effort to prevent
the harm at issue.").
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
96. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884).
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the current version of the Copyright Act, which states: "Copyright
protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.... '97
Unlike the term "author," the term "writings" is defined
primarily by the current Copyright Act. The first Congress defined
writings to encompass only maps, charts, and books. 98 The current
Copyright Act, however, expanded the definition to include: literary
works; musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and
choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion
pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and
architectural works. 99 In sum, when a person creates an original work
that fits into one of the eight available categories, the creator may
secure copyright protection for that work.
Once copyright protection has been secured, the Copyright Act
grants certain exclusive rights to the copyright holder. A copyright
holder generally has the exclusive right to reproduce the work,
prepare derivative works, and distribute copies to the public.100
Furthermore, for certain types of works, a copyright holder has the
exclusive right to perform and display the work publicly. 1°1 With few
exceptions, "[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright"'10 2 and the
copyright holder may bring an action against them for copyright
infringement.103
If a copyright holder is successful in an action against the
infringer, the copyright holder has several available remedies. First, a
court may "grant temporary and final injunctions . . . to prevent or
restrain infringement of a copyright.' ' 0 4 Second, a court may order
either the impounding of all copies claimed to have been made or used
or the destruction of all copies found to have been made or used "in
violation of the copyright owner's exclusive rights."105 Third, a
copyright holder is entitled to collect statutory damages, which are set
at not less than $750 and not more than $30,000.106
97. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
98. See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 56-57.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
100. Id. § 106(1)-(3).
101. Id. § 106(4)-(5).
102. Id. § 501(a).
103. Id. § 501(b).
104. Id. § 502(a).
105. Id. § 503 (a)-(b).
106. Id. § 504(c)(1). If the infringement was committed non-willfully, a court may
reduce the award to not less than $200 and if the infringement was committed willfully, a
court may increase the award to not more than $150,000. Id. § 504(c)(2).
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In lieu of accepting statutory damages, a copyright holder may
elect to recover actual damages. 10 7 The Copyright Act paints a
deceptively simple picture as to how actual damages are computed.
The Act lays out only the burdens of proof that each party to a
copyright infringement action must bear. 08 The copyright holder has
the burden of proving gross infringing revenue. 10 9 "[T]he infringer is
required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of
profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.""10 In
reality, however, "the calculation of attributable profits is factually
intense and can be very complex.""' Furthermore, "[n]either the
[Copyright] Act nor the Committee Reports specify which expenses
will be regarded as deductible costs" and therefore, case law must be
referred to for guidance. 112 It is important to note that copyright law
differs, remarkably in some aspects, from both trademark and patent
law. These other types of intellectual property are analyzed in the
following two sections.
B. An Overview of Patent Law and Patent Infringement
Patents are protected under the same Constitutional clause as
copyrights. 1 While for copyrights, protection is given to authors for
their writings for limited times, in the case of patents, protection is
given to inventors for their discoveries for limited times." 4 Similar to
copyrights, the scope of patent protection is primarily laid out in
statutes." 5 Generally speaking, patent protection is given to
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof"' 6 where "new" means not yet known 1 7 and not
obvious from an existing invention." 8




111. McNicholas & McNicholas, supra note 87, at 72.
112. NIMMER, supra note 8.
113. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
114. See id.
115. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
116. Id. § 101.
117. See id. § 102(a).
118. Id. § 103(a).
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Unlike copyrights, a patent is not valid until it is registered
with the Patent and Trademark Office. 119 Furthermore, in most
instances a patented invention must be marked to recover damages.
120
If an invention is not properly marked, "no damages shall be recovered
by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that
the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to
infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for
infringement occurring after such notice."'
21
Following in the footsteps of copyrights, patent holders have
certain exclusive rights that when infringed upon give a patent holder
the right to bring a civil action against the infringer.122 These
exclusive rights include the right to make, use, offer to sell, and sell
the invention. 123 When patent infringement is found, the patent holder
is entitled to "damages adequate to compensate for the infringement,
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer, together with interests and costs as fixed
by the court.'1
24
Although an explicit distinction is not made between willful
and non-willful infringers in the patent statutes, there is a provision
that allows courts to award increased "damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed.' 1 25 "A finding of willfulness . . . does not
mandate enhanced damages,"'126 but a finding of willfulness often
leads a court to award increased damages. 127 Furthermore, there is a
provision in the patent statutes that allows a court to award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.128 One of the common
scenarios in which attorney fees are awarded is in cases of willful
patent infringement. 29 Therefore, although the patent statutes do not
explicitly call for a distinction to be made between willful and non-
119. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (2000) with 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2000) ("registration is
not a condition of copyright protection").
120. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).
121. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (Trademarks follow a marking rule similar to that of
patents). Contra 17 U.S.C. § 401 (Generally speaking, marking is not a condition of
copyright protection).
122. Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a), 281 with 17 U.S.C. § 106.
123. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
124. Id. § 284.
125. Id.
126. Electro Scientific Indus., Inc. v. Gen. Scanning Inc., 247 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
127. See, e.g., nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int'l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
128. 35 U.S.C. § 285.
129. See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 688, 690 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
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willful infringers, a finding of willfulness may lead a court to require
the infringer to pay increased damages and attorney fees.
C. An Overview of Trademark Law and Trademark Infringement
Trademarks, which are marks "by which the goods of the
applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others,"130 receive
Federal protection primarily by statute. 13' In addition to traditional
trademarks, product names and logotypes, including trade dress,
titles, characters, trade names, service marks, and internet domain
names are all protected.132
Unlike copyrights, trademarks only become effective after
certain registration requirements are met.133 Furthermore, the
duration of trademark protection differs from the duration of
copyright protection. For example, while copyright protection is
available only for "limited times,"' 34 the duration of trademark
protection is indefinite. 135 Although trademarks are initially covered
for only a ten-year period, "each registration may be renewed for
periods of 10 years at the end of each successive 10-year period
following the date of registration .... ,136
Copyrights and trademarks do, however, have some similar
features. For example, both copyright and trademark holders have
certain exclusive rights. 137 The trademark holder has exclusive rights
to use the mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods and services associated with
the mark. 38 As is the case with copyrights, when any of the exclusive
trademark rights are violated, the trademark holder may bring a civil
action against the infringer. 139
When a trademark holder is successful in a civil action, various
remedies are available. First, a court may grant an injunction to
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000).
131. See id. § 1051-1141.
132. JAY DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE,
AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 9.01 (2005).
133. See 15 U.S.C. § 1111. "[Rlegistration is not a condition of copyright protection."
17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2000).
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a). After the Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. §
302, was enacted, some argued that copyright protection was effectively infinite as well.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). This view, however, has been rejected by the
Supreme Court. Id.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a).
137. 17 U.S.C. § 106; 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
139. Id.
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prevent the violation of any of the trademark holder's exclusive
rights. 140 Second, a court may order the destruction of all items
bearing the infringing mark and "all plates, molds, matrices, and
other means of making" the mark.' 4 ' Finally, a trademark holder is
generally entitled to recover the infringer's profits, any damages
sustained by the plaintiff, and the costs of the action. 142 Similar to the
framework in copyright infringement actions, the trademark holder
has the burden of proving the infringer's sales. 143 The infringer is
responsible for proving all elements of cost or reduction.
144
Whether trademark infringement is willful or non-willful does
not play as large of a role in trademark law as it does in copyright law.
Nevertheless, the distinction is sometimes meaningful, especially
where counterfeit marks are involved. For example, when an infringer
is found to have "intentionally us[ed] "a mark or designation, knowing
such mark or designation is a counterfeit mark," treble profits or
treble damages, whichever is greater, together with reasonable
attorney's fees are the measure unless the court finds extenuating
circumstances. 145 Also, where counterfeit marks are involved, a
trademark holder may elect statutory damages instead of actual
damages. 146 In cases of non-willful infringement involving counterfeit
marks, statutory damages must be not less than $500 and not more
than $100,000.147 The ceiling increases to not more than $1,000,000
when infringement is willful. 148 In sum, although the remedies
available to a trademark holder are generally the same regardless of
whether the infringement was willful or non-willful, there are some
circumstances, such as where counterfeit marks are involved, in which
the distinction is critical.
D. There Should Be One Deductibility Rule for Copyrights, Patents,
and Trademarks
As explained above, willfulness plays a role in copyright,
patent, and trademark infringement cases. In all copyright and patent
140. Id. § 1116(a).
141. Id. § 1118.
142. Id. § 1117(a).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. § 1117(b).
146. Id. § 1117(c).
147. Id. § 1117(c)(1).
148. Id. § 1117(c)(2).
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infringement cases, a willful infringer may be required to pay more in
damages than a non-willful infringer would have to pay.149 And the
same is true in certain trademark infringement cases, particularly
those involving counterfeit marks.150 Because willfulness is considered
in copyright, patent, and trademark contexts, the determination of
whether tax is a proper deductible expense should be the same in all
three types of intellectual property infringement cases. Therefore, the
deductibility rule recommended in this note for non-willful copyright
infringement is also applicable to non-willful patent and trademark
infringement.
E. In the Context of Copyrights, the Willful / Non-Willful Distinction
is Meaningful
When allocating damages in a copyright infringement suit, the
distinction between willful and non-willful infringement is
meaningful. In nearly all copyright infringement suits where
infringement is found, a copyright holder may elect to receive
statutory damages from the infringer. 151 This election may be made at
any time up until final judgment. 152 The fact that a court may award
as little as $200 in statutory damages in cases of non-willful
infringement but as much as $150,000 in statutory damages in cases
of willful infringement 153 shows that Congress, in creating the
Copyright Act, intended to distinguish between willful and non-willful
infringers.
Moreover, although Larson was a trademark infringement
case, the Supreme Court made it fairly clear that the issue of
willfulness is meaningful when determining whether tax is a proper
deductible expense from gross infringing trademark revenue. 154 The
Larson opinion was a mere two paragraphs long but within those two
paragraphs the Court made at least three references to the willful
conduct of the trademark infringer.
First, the Court stated that "[c]ircumstances will affect the
conclusion [of whether a deduction would be proper], including in
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000); nCube Corp. v. Seachange Intern, Inc., 436
F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
150. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b), (c).
151. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2), (c)(1).
152. Id. § 504(c)(1).
153. Id. § 504(c)(2).
154. See L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. WM. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U.S. 97, 100 (1928).
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them the knowledge and the conduct of the party charged."'155 Next,
the court explained:
It would be unjust to charge an infringer with the gross amount of his sales
without allowing him for the materials and labor that were necessary to produce
the things sold, but it does not follow that he should be allowed what he paid for
the chance to do what he knew that he had no right to do. 156
Finally, the Court concluded: "in a case of what has been found to
have been one of conscious and deliberate wrongdoing, we think it just
that the a deduction should not be allowed."157 The Court's focus on
the issue of willfulness in Larson is strong circumstantial evidence
that the Court would consider the same issue in a copyright context. 158
F. A Rule of Deductibility Should Apply to Non- Willful Copyright
Infringers
Tax should be a proper deductible expense from gross
infringing revenue when copyright infringement is non-willful.
Larson, which holds that tax is not a proper deductible expense in
willful trademark infringement cases, carefully limited the breadth of
its holding to cases of willful infringement. 159 The Supreme Court
opined:
No doubt there are cases in which such a deduction would be proper ....
Circumstances will affect the conclusion, including in them the knowledge and the
conduct of the party charged .... [I]n a case of what has been found to have been
one of conscious and deliberate wrongdoing, we think it just that the further
deduction should not be allowed.
160
The Seventh Circuit, in determining that non-willful patent infringers
should be allowed the deduction, reasoned:
If from this language it may be concluded that where the accounting party had
been acting in good faith, and with his infringement there was no admixture of
deliberation or willfulness, "such a deduction would be proper." If not in such a
case, we fail to comprehend the significance of what was so said [in Larson].
161
Because the willful / non-willful distinction is more prevalent in




158. As discussed below, there is circuit court precedent showing that courts should
consider willfulness in the copyright context. See discussion infra Part F.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 99-100.
161. Stromberg Motor Devices Co. v. Detroit Trust Co., 44 F.2d 958, 965 (7th Cir.
1930) (citing Larson, 277 U.S. at 99).
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should be applied to cases dealing with copyright infringement as
well.
There is also strong precedential support for the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation of the limiting language in Larson and the
conclusion that a rule of deductibility is proper for non-willful
copyright infringers. 162 In two copyright infringement cases, Three
Boys Music and In Design, the court found in favor of a rule of
deductibility for non-willful copyright infringers. 163 The only other
circuit court cases to have dealt with the issue of deductibility for non-
willful infringers are patent cases. Even in the patent context, two of
the three circuits to have considered the deductibility issue, the Third
and the Seventh, found in favor of a rule of deductibility for non-
willful infringers. 64 Because there is overwhelming precedential
support for a rule of deductibility for non-willful infringers and very
little support for the opposite proposition, all circuits should adopt the
former rule.
Furthermore, hypothetical discussions of possible indirect tax
ramifications, such as those proposed by the Sixth Circuit in
Schnadig,165 should have no bearing on whether a rule of deductibility
or non-deductibility is selected. As one district court stated:
Deductions allowed defendant in computing its federal income tax concern only the
Government and the defendant taxpayer, and are of no concern to plaintiff. The tax
situation of each party is entirely separate and independent. Plaintiff has no more
interest in whether a deduction of the amount of the judgment resulted in a tax
saving to defendant, than defendant has in the taxes which plaintiff may have to
pay on the amount of income it received pursuant to the decree in the patent
infringement accounting.
166
Finally, distinguishing willful and non-willful copyright
infringers comports with notions of equity. Willful infringers
knowingly use another's intellectual property for their own benefit.
Non-willful infringers, on the other hand, either do not know or do not
think that they are infringing. From an equitable point of view, these
two classes of persons should be treated differently.
162. See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 488 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that tax is a proper deductible expense for non-willful copyright infringers); In
Design v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding same); Duplate
Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 81 F.2d 352, 356 (3d Cir. 1935), modified by 298 U.S. 448
(1936) (holding that tax is a proper deductible expense for non-willful patent infringers);
Contra Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1171 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding
that tax is not a proper deductible expense for any design patent infringer).
163. Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 488; In Design, 13 F.3d at 567.
164. Duplate, 81 F.2d at 356; Detroit Trust, 44 F.2d at 965.
165. Schnadig, 620 F.2d at 1169.
166. Triplex Safety Glass Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 38 F. Supp. 639, 643 (D.
Del. 1941).
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G. A Rule of Non-Deductibility Should Not Apply to Non-Willful
Copyright Infringers
The Sixth Circuit is the lone circuit to decide a case which
could be extended to argue that tax should never be a deductible
expense in the copyright infringement context. 167 The premise of the
court's argument in Schnadig is that if an infringer is required to pay
a pre-tax damage award, he will likely be reimbursed for the tax paid
after including the damage award as a tax deduction on a subsequent
tax return. 168 The hypothetical that the court used to illustrate this
possible tax ramification is worth repeating here. The court stated:
[I]f a company earned a net pre-tax profit of $100 by infringing, paid $50 in tax,
and paid the remaining $50 as damages to the patentee, the infringer would have
no remaining cash, but would have a $50 tax deduction available to him. At our
fictional 50% tax rate, this deduction would be worth $25 to the infringer, and if
the deduction is fully utilized it would represent a $25 net overall gain on the
infringement. The reciprocal of the infringer's deduction of the award is the
patentee's inclusion of the award in his gross income. Retaining our fictional 50%
tax rate, the patentee will keep only $25 of the $50 award, paying the other $25 in
tax. In that hypothetical, but very realistic, possibility, the infringer nets as much
as his victim, and perhaps even more if the dynamics of the money market are
considered. 169
The court explained that "[a]lthough the above illustration is true in
theory, the actual dollar impact of a damage award on the taxes of
either party will naturally depend upon the party's overall tax
situation."'170 The court admitted that "[tax rates will vary, and
"offsetting losses could conceivably bar use of the deduction or negate
any tax effect of the award."' 71 The court goes on to conclude, however,
that "the "vast majority of infringers should be able to utilize the
deduction."172
When closely examined, however, the Sixth Circuit's decision is
not controlling on the issue of tax deductibility in the copyright
context. First, the court specifically limited the breadth of its holding
to cases of design patent infringement.173 Moreover, the court noted in
dicta that the district court's "findings indicate[d] conscious and
deliberate infringement" by the defendant.174 Therefore, while this
case would certainly not be controlling in a case dealing with
167. See Schnadig, 620 F.2d at 1171 (deciding a patent infringement claim).
168. See id. at 1169-70.
169. Id. at 1169 (citation omitted).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1169-70.
172. Id. at 1170.
173. See id. at 1171.
174. Id. at 1171 n.11.
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copyright infringement, it is questionable whether it would even be
controlling in a non-willful design patent infringement case.
In their law review article, the McNicholas praise the Sixth
Circuit's analysis and advocate for a rule of non-deductibility in all
copyright infringement cases.175 The McNicholas aruge that a per se
rule of non-deductibility for all copyright infringers has many benefits
and places any loss on the infringer. 176
The authors' attack on a rule of deductibility for non-willful
copyright infringers is really an attack on the current tax scheme. The
In Design court held: 'We think that when a claim is made for
infringing profits, 'this means profits actually made. A book profit of a
dollar is not a profit actually made when from the dollar the
government takes twenty cents as the price for the right to make any
profit at all.' "177 It is true that a copyright infringer may net an
overall gain after including a post-tax damage award as a tax
deduction on a subsequent tax return.178 Furthermore, it is true that a
copyright holder will not recover the full amount of his or her lost
profits because he or she will be required to include the damage award
as taxable income on a subsequent tax return. 79 This, however, is the
tax scheme as laid out by Congress and in laying out this scheme,
Congress has implicitly rejected the proposition that the defendant is
the proper party to bear a tax loss.
H. Variations on a General Rule of Deductibility
Two variations on a general rule of deductibility for non-willful
copyright infringers can be extracted from cases decided before the
Supreme Court's ruling in Larson. First, in Macbeth-Evans Glass Co.
v. L.E. Smith Glass Co., a patent infringement case, the Third Circuit
held that the infringer may properly deduct tax paid on gross
infringing revenue before paying a damage award to the patent
holder. 80 The court went further, however, holding that if the
infringer received a tax refund for including the damage award as a
175. McNicholas & McNicholas, supra note 87, at 72-73.
176. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
177. 13 F.3d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. L.E. Smith
Glass Co., 23 F.2d 459, 463 (3d Cir. 1927)).
178. See generally I.R.C. § 162; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(c); Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines
Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1169 (6th Cir. 1980).
179. See United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 92-93
(1936); see also Mathey v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 177 F.2d 259, 260-61 (1st Cir.
1949).
180. 23 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1927). No determination as to the willfulness of the
defendant's infringement was made in this case.
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tax deduction on a subsequent tax return, the infringer would be
required to pay that amount to the patent holder.' 8 ' This rule would
prevent the infringer from realizing any net gain from their
infringement.
Although this rule may seem compelling, it cuts against the
current federal tax scheme. In any case for the recovery of lost profits,
the tax scheme requires the plaintiff to include a damage award as
taxable income 8 2 and allows the defendant to include the damage
award as a tax deduction on a subsequent tax return. 83 No exception
to this tax scheme is carved out for copyright infringement or for any
other intellectual property infringement. Furthermore, the court's rule
may be impractical because it will often require the infringer to
compensate the copyright holder long after the conclusion of an
infringement suit. Because this rule upsets the tax scheme and
because implementation of it may be impractical, it should not be
adopted.
Another variation on the general rule of deductibility for non-
willful copyright infringers can be extracted from the Seventh Circuit
trademark infringement opinion that was overruled by the Supreme
Court in Larson. The Seventh Circuit advocated for a rule which
allowed a tax deduction but required the amount of the deduction to
be the amount that the trademark holder would have paid (and not
the amount the infringer actually paid) had the trademark holder
received the infringing profits in the first instance. 8 4 The court
reasoned that it would be unfair for the infringer to pay either a
higher or lower tax rate than the trademark holder would have
paid. 8
5
This rule, however, is not compatible with the plain language
of the Copyright Act. The Act states:
The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or
her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are
attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the
actual damages. In establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is
required to present proof only of the infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is
required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit
attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.
1 8 6
181. See id. at 463-64.
182. Safety Car, 297 U.S. at 92-93.
183. See generally I.R.C. § 162; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(c); Schnadig, 620 F.2d at
1169.
184. L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. WM. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 20 F.2d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 1927).
185. Id.
186. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2000).
COPYRIGHT INFRINGERS
Because the Copyright Act is concerned with the infringer's
gross revenue and the infringer's deductible expenses, the proper tax
deduction would be the amount of taxes the infringer paid. Although
this rule seems equitable, it does not comport with the plain language
of the Copyright Act and should not be adopted.
III. CONCLUSION
Copyrights are protected by the Constitution18 7 and by the
Copyright Act of 1976.188 The holder of a copyright has certain
exclusive rights18 9 and when those rights are infringed upon, the
copyright holder has a civil cause of action against the infringer. 190
Once infringement is found, a copyright holder may elect to receive
actual damages, which are computed by subtracting deductible
expenses from the portion of the infringer's gross revenue that is
attributable to the infringement. 191 One potential deductible expense
is the tax paid by the infringer on the infringing profits.
While the Supreme Court held in Larson that a willful
trademark infringer is not entitled to such a deduction, it left open the
possibility that a non-willful infringer would be allowed the
deduction.192 There is compelling precedential support for the
proposition that a deduction should be allowed in cases of non-willful
copyright infringement. Two cases dealing with copyright
infringement, Three Boys Music and In Design, both held that a non-
willful copyright infringer is allowed the deduction.1 93 Furthermore,
two cases dealing with patent infringement, Detroit Trust and
Duplate, have declared a similar rule in the patent context. 194 Only
one case, Schnadig, has, arguably in dicta, declared a rule of non-
deductibility for both willful and non-willful infringers. 95 That case,
however, was explicitly limited to cases of design patent infringement
187. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
188. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332.
189. Id. § 106
190. Id. § 501.
191. See id. § 504(b).
192. L.P. Larson, Jr., Co., v. WM. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U.S. 97 (1928).
193. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 488 (9th Cir. 2000); In Design
v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1994).
194. Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 81 F.2d 352, 356 (3d Cir. 1935),
modified by 298 U.S. 448 (1936); Stromberg Motor Devices Co. v. Detroit Trust Co., 44 F.2d
958, 965 (7th Cir. 1930).
195. Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1171 (6th Cir. 1980).
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and may even be dicta with regards to non-willful design patent
infringers.
196
In addition to strong precedential support for a rule of
deductibility for non-willful copyright infringers, the Copyright Act
supports a rule that distinguishes between willful and non-willful
infringers. The Act's provision regarding statutory damages, which
may be awarded in nearly every copyright infringement case, allows a
court to award a much larger statutory damages award in cases of
willful infringement than it may award in cases of non-willful
infringement.' 97 Moreover, the Act's increased punishment of willful
infringers comports with notions of equity.
In sum, a rule of deductibility in cases of non-willful copyright
infringement is warranted for three reasons. First, the Supreme
Court's limited its non-deductibility language in Larson to cases of
willful trademark infringement. And, because the Copyright Act
makes a meaningful distinction between willful and non-willful
copyright infringers, the limiting language in Larson should apply to
copyrights in the same way it applied in that case to trademarks.
Second, there is strong precedential support in favor of a rule of
deductibility for non-willful copyright infringers and little support in
favor of the opposite rule. Finally, a rule of deductibility comports with
notions of equity. Therefore, in the absence of guidance from either
Congress or the Supreme Court, circuit courts should choose to adopt
a rule of deductibility for cases of non-willful copyright infringement.
Christine Ballard
196. Id. at 1171.
197. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), (2) (2000).
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